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“Loose connections are the connections you need. It’s the No. 1 rule of business.”
Sallie Krawcheck, owner of the global women’s network 85 Broads1
1 Introduction
Gender differences in labor market outcomes remain striking. In the US, women’s earn-
ings in 2012 were on average 80.9% of men’s earnings.2 Even though part of it can be
explained by occupational sorting, within occupations wage gaps are considerable. Man-
agement occupations, such as financial manager and chief executive, are particularly af-
fected, whereas healthcare support and administrative occupations show much smaller
gaps.3 Similar patterns were found for the UK, where full-time working women in the fi-
nancial sector earn 55% less than full-time male workers – a gap twice as large as the gap
in the economy as a whole.4 What these high-wage-gap occupations have in common
is that they are characterized by a large amount of uncertainty, commonly measured by
earnings variability. Earnings of both executives and financial managers are largely based
on performance pay and thus not constant. Women’s lower earnings in these occupations
are mainly due to large differences in performance pay and bonuses, suggesting that men
perform better.5 At the same time, and possibly as a logical consequence, more men than
women sort into occupations with high earnings volatility.6 But why do women perform
relatively poorly in “high-risk” occupations and avoid them?
In this paper, we offer a novel answer to this question, which is based on social net-
work heterogeneity between men and women.7 We argue that men’s network structures
allow them to perform better in uncertain environments compared to women and our
model clarifies why this is the case. This approach is motivated by our novel empirical
finding that men’s and women’s social networks differ. We show in the AddHealth Data
Set that women have fewer friends than men, that is they have a lower degree, but their
1Krawcheck at Marie Claire’s luncheon for the New Guard, November 2013.
2See the report of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2012.pdf
3See BLS-Reports (2013), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2012.pdf
4Wage differences are considerable even when controlling for hours of work (full time) and type of job.
See the report by the Equality and H.R.Commission (2009).
5Again, see the report by the Equality and H.R.Commission (2009).
6See Dohmen and Falk (2011).
7Common explanations for these patterns are discrimination against women in male-dominated environ-
ments, or differences in preferences and risk aversion. See Eckel and Grossman (2008) for an overview of
the literature that finds women to be more risk averse than men. Other explanations involve differences in
bargaining strength, which can account for part of the gender wage gap (Card et al. (2013)) as well as future
fertility concerns which leads women to self-select in different occupations (Adda et al. (2011)).
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friends are more likely to be friends among each other, implying a higher clustering coef-
ficient.8 Thus, women have smaller but tighter networks, whereas men have larger but
looser ego networks. We argue that the network patterns among friends carry over to
the informal network structures at the workplace, an assumption in line with Burt (2011)
and supported by case studies (Brands and Kilduff (2013)).
We argue that tight and loose networks provide different types of social capital: a tight
network fosters trust or peer pressure among agents, as it prevents them from shirking.
This is because they fear repercussions not only from the individual they affect directly
with their behavior but also from other members of their network. As a result, closed
networks help overcome free-riding problems (Coleman (1988a)).9 But network closure
comes at a cost.10 Networks with high closure do not allow individuals to access as
much information and other low-value resources as networks with lower closure. Being
in a loose network with links to individuals that are not connected themselves is par-
ticularly valuable for information acquisition. This is what the literature has referred
to as the “strength of weak ties” (Granovetter (1973)).11 We are interested under what
circumstances tightly connected female networks and thus high peer pressure are more
important for performance on the job and in what environments the opposite is the case.12
We develop a theory where networks provide both access to information as well as peer
pressure and outline the implications of different network structures on wages.
In our model, workers repeatedly form partnerships to complete projects. Project
success positively depends on the partners’ efforts. Effort is unobservable and only the
project outcome is public information. If the project is completed successfully, the project
payoff is shared between the team members. Because output is split but costs are not,
there is a team moral hazard problem at work. As a result, the project partners exert inef-
ficiently low effort.13 We will show how networks can help attenuate this moral hazard
8We are using data of teenagers, not of men and women who are already employed. We do this as we are
interested in the informal networks, not the formal ones. To the best of our knowledge there does not exist a
sufficiently big data set that contains information on informal networks at the workplace.
9Specifically, closed networks mitigate free-riding problems through the creation of norms and punish-
ment systems. Coleman (1988b) stresses the importance of this mechanism for diamond traders in New York.
10All of this literature assumes that individuals have a fixed budget of time.
11These two types of social capital can also be related to the concepts of bonding versus bridging social
capital defined in Putnam (2000).
12We do not aim to address the question of job search, as has been done, for example, in Arrow and
Borzekowski (2004), Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004), Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2007), but we are
interested in how the network structure matters once the job has been found.
13See Holmstrom (1982) for moral hazard problems in teams.
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problem by increasing effort.
We are interested in the effort levels of the project partners as a proxy for their perfor-
mance and specifically in the factors influencing this choice. First, the choice of effort de-
pends on information about the value of the project, which can be high or low, depending
on the state of the world. Workers receive signals about the state through their network
and form expectations about the project value. These expectations influence effort. The
more signals and thus information a worker has, the more precise is his belief about the
state of the world. This allows for a better judgment as the optimal effort is state depen-
dent. Second, effort positively depends on the amount of peer pressure individuals face.
How much information a worker has and how much peer pressure he faces depends
on his network structure. Workers with a higher degree hold more information, as they
receive a higher number of signals about the state of the world. In turn, workers with
higher clustering face more peer pressure through the following mechanism: a failed
project leads to discord between the project partners. But this discord also affects their
common friends, that is their disagreement spreads through the entire group – an idea
based on the structural balance theory.14 Since an intact friendship is necessary for a suc-
cessful project, repercussions of a failure are worse for a worker with high clustering
compared to someone with a looser network. Therefore, higher clustering leads to higher
effort in order to be on good terms with future potential project partners.15
Our model allows the ranking of networks by their benefit for job performance. We
show under which circumstances a network with higher clustering is more beneficial for
performance and ultimately wages and when a network with a higher degree is more
advantageous. Our main findings are as follows: A higher degree is more beneficial for
performance in volatile environments, where the uncertainty about the project value is
considerable, which is particularly true when (i) overall information (that is information
coming from sources unrelated to the network) is scarce, (ii) when signals are noisy and
(iii) when project rewards differ significantly across the two states. In these cases, uncer-
tainty about the state of the world and associated rewards is large and the benefits of a
purely information-based, loose network outweigh the benefits of a closed network that
14This is a concept first proposed by Heider (1946) who has spawned a field of research that remains active
until today. For an overview on the numerous works on structural balance theory, see Easley and Kleinberg
(2010), chapters 3 and 5.
15Note that in our model links are never cut and disagreement is considered to be only short term.
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leads to more peer pressure. In turn, peer pressure leads to higher effort and thus project
completion in environments characterized by certainty where additional information has
no value. In general, someone with more information can better fine-tune his effort to the
expected project reward, exerting high effort only when there is something at stake. In
turn, a worker facing high peer pressure exerts extra effort even if the project reward is
expected to be low.
Effort choices directly translate into wages. Someone with higher clustering earns
more than someone with higher degree when uncertainty about the state is negligible (in
both states of the world). Such a worker also has a comparative advantage in jobs whose
outcomes are more certain compared to jobs with less certain outcomes. Finally, we show
that, due to the dynamic effect of clustering, there is a strong persistence of wage patterns
across time, consolidating early career wage gaps.
We then model a man’s network as one that is characterized by a relatively high de-
gree and a woman’s network as one that is characterized by relatively high clustering. We
provide a mechanism of how this social network heterogeneity relates to differences in
labor market outcomes of men and women and show that our theory is consistent with
a variety of empirical facts: (1) Wage gaps within occupations are large and especially
within those occupations that characterized by uncertainty, such as the financial sector
or the film industry.16 (2) More men than women choose occupations with high earnings
volatility (Dohmen and Falk (2011)). In our model, this would happen even though both
men and women are risk-neutral and thus have the same attitude towards risk. The rea-
son is that women have a comparative advantage in job environments characterized by
little uncertainty. (3) Having women in the network is particularly beneficial high up in
the organizational hierarchy (Lalanne and Seabright (2011)). In light of our model, we
expect that having women in the network is particularly beneficial when information is
abundant. We argue that this is the case at higher levels of the organizational hierarchy
when networks have grown large rather than in low positions that are commonly held at
the beginning of the career. (4) During recessions (i.e. when returns are low) men’s un-
employment exceeds women’s unemployment (Albanesi and Sahin (2013)). Our model
predicts that, incentivized by peer pressure, women put over-effort despite low expected
16See, for instance, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2012.pdf or Equality and H.R.Commission (2009),
which will be discussed in depth.
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rewards whereas men are more selective in their effort choice. Women’s higher effort
does not hinge on the fact that they have different expectations, but will emerge even
with the same predicted reward. (5) The beginning of the career is the crucial period for
the emergence of a wage gap (Babcock and Laschever (2003), Gerhart and Rynes (1991),
Martell et al. (1996)). In our model, an initial wage gap is strongly persistent because
women are deprived of more project opportunities over time due to their high cluster-
ing. This makes it difficult for them to catch up.
In sum, we expect that, based on their loose networks, men outperform women in
work environments that are characterized by uncertainty but yield high expected returns
– conditions that are typical for a large number of jobs in business and research. Our
predictions are in line with what various business leaders consider conventional wisdom:
Loose instead of deep connections are the key to success in business.
Related Literature We contribute to the work on the gender wage gap (a review of
gender wage differences can be found in Blau and Kahn (2000)). Common explanations
for this gap are discrimination (Black and Strahan (2001), Goldin and Rouse (2000), Wen-
neras and Wold (1997) ) and differences in abilities and preferences which result in occu-
pational self-selection (Polachek (1981)). Differences between men and women have also
been found in their competitiveness (Gneezy et al. (2003), Gneezy and Rustichini (2004)),
risk aversion (for a summary, see Eckel and Grossman (2008) ), in their ability in bargain-
ing (Card et al. (2013)) and in terms of future fertility concerns (Adda et al. (2011)). We
suggest a new disparity between men and women, their network structure, as a source
of wage disparity.
We also add to the limited amount of network literature that evaluates the trade-off
between network density and the network span. This trade-off has first been analyzed
in Karlan et al. (2009) where individuals use their network to borrow goods. They fo-
cus on the trust generated in networks and find that higher closure increases trust and
enables agents to borrow high value goods. But network closure reduces access making
less easy to borrow frequently low value goods. Although the impact of network closure
on economic outcomes is analyzed in both Karlan et al. (2009) and our work, the theo-
retical frameworks and applications are entirely different. In our setting, networks do
not generate trust but transmit information and provide peer pressure and both features
impact performance on the job. Dixit (2003) also discusses the trade-off between sparse
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and closed networks in a trade setting. He focuses on the role of self governance, as an
alternative to official institutions, in trading relationships. Trading with more distant in-
dividuals offers higher gains, but information flows about cheating are decreasing in this
distance. There is a clear trade-off between networks that have a high closure, that is a
local bias in trade, and networks that span a larger distance but this trade-off differs from
ours which focusses on information and peer pressure.
Our work also contributes to a growing literature on the effects of peer pressure. Kan-
del and Lazear (1992) incorporate peer pressure in their model through a simple function,
where peer pressure depends on own effort, the effort of peers as well as other actions of
the agents that do not affect firm output directly. Their finding is that peer pressure in-
duces individuals to exert higher effort, which leads to a higher profit for the firm. They
argue that firms can create peer pressure by establishing norms and mutual monitoring.
In the case of mutual monitoring, the crucial issue is to define the relevant group, that is
the team, the department or the entire firm. We put forward an alternative source of peer
pressure (i.e., the social network), define the relevant group (i.e., friends and common
friends) and provide a novel mechanism of how peer pressure operates.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we document empirically that men’s and
women’s networks differ. In Section 3, we develop the general model, which we then
solve for the static case in Section 4 and for the dynamic case in Section 5. Section 6
connects our predictions on gender differences in labor market outcomes to a variety of
empirical facts. Section 7 discusses our equilibrium selection. Section 8 concludes.
2 Gender Differences in Networks
A main assumption of our model is that women have a higher clustering coefficient than
men, but that men have a higher degree than women. This assumption is based on our
findings from the AddHealth data set that male and female networks differ.
The AddHealth data set contains data on students in grades 7-12 from a nationally
representative sample of roughly 140 US schools in 1994-95. Every student attending the
sampled schools on the interview day is asked to compile a questionnaire (in-school data)
on respondents’ demographic and behavioral characteristics, education, family back-
ground and friendships. The AddHealth website describes surveys and data in detail.
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This sample contains information on 90,118 students.17
Why AddHealth? Our main reason for using a dataset of students instead of employ-
ees in a firm is to circumvent the problem that networks can be shaped by the work
environment. For instance, if men and women prefer to have friends of the same gen-
der, some male-dominated work environments would cause women to have smaller net-
works. Moreover, if we were using data of firms or occupations we would be concerned
that individuals with certain network types sort into those occupations and firms for
which their network type is most beneficial. However, at the school level there is no
such selection bias or constrained availability of same-sex individuals. We can therefore
estimate male and female network structures more accurately with this data set.
Further, it is well documented that individuals are more likely to name others as
their friends if these have a higher social status, see Marsden (2005). At the workplace
social status is connected to a higher position in the hierarchy and therefore to formal
power. However, here we think of a link between individuals as a friendship instead
of trying to have a connection with someone superior. Additionally, as higher status
is connected to formal power, it is difficult to distinguish between formal and informal
networks. We believe that this is less of a problem at school as by definition the networks
formed there are informal. There might be some misreporting in the sense that popular
children will also be named as friends by individuals who would just like to be associated
with them. But we believe that there is less of an incentive for high school students to
be strategic about their friendship nominations than for employees. A possible reason
is that superiors might be able to access this nomination data and therefore employees
have an incentive to name them. In contrast, from the design of AddHealth it is clear that
students will not have access to the nomination data.
We are interested in these network characteristics of men and women as exogenous
types, comparable to different ability or skill types commonly used in the literature, where
this network type is stable over time. Burt (2011) provides evidence for the existence of
different network types from a multi-role game in a virtual world.18 He finds that people
17For more information on the AddHealth data set, see http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/
addhealth.
18This is a video game where players can play different roles and the different roles require different
network structures. For some roles it is better to be linked to individuals, who are connected, for others
having friends who are not connected is more beneficial. In other terms, it can be good or bad to have a high
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build a similar type of network, e.g., a network that is more or less closed, where friends
are more or less likely to be connected, independently of what is required for the role.19
Based on this, we argue that boys’ and girls’ networks at school, closely resemble the
ones they will form as adults both in their private and work life in terms of closure.20
Friendship Network The friendship network constructed from the AddHealth data is a
directed network, based on friendship nominations.21 For this network, we compute both
directed and undirected clustering coefficients as well as in-, out- and overall degree.22
The clustering coefficient is computed as the ratio of the number of links between a
node’s neighbors to the total possible number of links between the node’s neighbors, both
for the directed and undirected network. To give an illustrating example, the clustering
coefficient in a star network is zero whereas it is one in a ring network with three nodes.
The in-degree denotes how often an individual was named, the out-degree gives how
many friends this individual named and the degree is the sum of in- and out-degree.
We focus on the subsample of students that are older than 17 since they are closest to
the working age, which is the age we are interested in.23 We do a t-test of the standardized
variables and consider the differences between boys and girls. The results are given in
Table 1. We find that boys of this age have a lower clustering coefficient, independently
of whether we consider the directed or undirected one, and also a higher in-, out- and
overall degree than girls.
Male and Female Networks Beyond AddHealth To the best of our knowledge, differ-
ences in the clustering coefficient between men and women have not been documented
in the literature with the exception of Brands and Kilduff (2013). They have a sample
clustering coefficient.
19About a third of network variance is consistent with individuals across roles, but the correlation coeffi-
cient between the network formed and the network type is above 0.5.
20Unfortunately, there does not exist much further evidence of how persistent network types are or, in gen-
eral, of how persistent differences between girls and boys are, i.e. whether this improves over time or not.
A notable exception is Sutter and Rützler (2010) who show that gender differences in competitive behavior
emerge as early as age three and are quite persistent over time. The girls who exhibited a more competi-
tive behavior earlier on, were more likely to be less competitive later on, those who were less competitive
remained so. Therefore, the gender differences became more pronounced later in life.
21For more details on the friendship networks, see the Appendix.
22For the undirected clustering coefficient we assume that a link exists if at least one of the individuals
named the other one as a friend.
23Our results for the entire sample are given in the Appendix.
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Table 1: Difference in Network Characteristics Men-Women
Age > 17
Cl. Coeff. (dir.) -0.0677∗∗∗
(0.0144)
Cl. Coeff. -0.0618∗∗∗
(0.0145)
In Degree 0.0222∗
(0.00965)
Out Degree 0.0208∗∗
(0.00669)
Degree 0.0259∗∗∗
(0.00749)
Observations 28259
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, Standard errors in parentheses.
of 33 employees, 16 men and 17 women. They calculate the constraint as well as the
out-degree of the workers, where constraint is the extent to which an individual’s friends
are also friends among each other (Burt (1992)). Constraint is therefore closely related to
the clustering coefficient. They find that men have a significantly lower constraint and
higher out-degree, which is in line with our findings. Additionally, Fischer and Oliker
(1983) look at the number of friends individuals have. They show that women have a
lower number of friends than men, in particular at the workplace. We use part of the
table from Fischer and Oliker (1983), p. 127, to document this. Their sample consists of
Under 36,
unmarried,
no children
Under 36,
married,
no children
Under 36,
married,
children
36-64,
married,
no children
36-64,
married,
children
Men 2.8 3.4 3.1 2.3 2.0
Women 2.5 2.1 0.9 1.4 1.4
Men (N) 113 50 70 63 54
Women(N) 76 51 98 67 60
Table 2: Friendships with Coworkers, see Fischer and Oliker (1983), p. 127
employed men and women. They find that the number of friendships with co-workers
differs greatly between them. For individuals under 36, who are unmarried and do not
have children, the gender difference in the number of friends at the workplace is small:
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men have on average 2.8 friends, women 2.5. But this difference increases, when men
and women under 36 and married, with or without children, are compared. Without
children, men have on average one more friend than women, with children they even
have two more friends at the workplace. Therefore, our finding that older girls have a
lower degree than older boys does not suddenly reverse, but is also documented for man
and women at the workplace across all age groups.
Other studies also find network differences across gender. That girls and boys have
different types of networks has been shown by Eder and Hallinan (1978) and is also docu-
mented in a survey by Belle (1989). The emphasis in this literature is on dyadic and triadic
relationships, whereas we focus on the entire network. Gender differences in networks
for adults have been shown by Kürtösi (2008), Tattersall and Keogh (2006) and Marsden
(1987). These studies stress the number of friends and the content of relationships but
do not contain precise information on gender differences in the network structure. Nev-
ertheless, they show that women form closed groups and emotional ties, whereas men’s
networks are sparser and characterized by instrumental ties, supporting our findings.
Taking our estimation results together with the evidence in the literature, we feel con-
fident to assume that men’s and women’s network types differ with women having a
higher clustering coefficient but lower degree than men. This points to a new dimen-
sion of heterogeneity between men and women, which might help explain the gender
wage gap and differences in occupational sorting. We do not have a causal argument
since there might be an underlying factor that causes these network differences but also
impacts labor market outcomes directly. Identifying the source of network differences
is beyond the scope of this paper. Nor do we want to argue that differences in social
networks is the whole story behind wage and performance gaps as well as occupational
sorting. However, we do believe that networks play an important role and our model
clarifies how these network differences can matter for job performance and wages.
In our setting, a higher clustering coefficient leads to higher peer pressure and a
higher degree leads to more information. Both of these features are valuable and we
characterize environments under which peer pressure is more beneficial and contrast
them to settings where access to information is more important. We then obtain theoreti-
cal predictions for when we would expect men to perform better than women, which we
connect in Section 6 to observed disparities in labor market outcomes. Our first step is to
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develop a model that translates clustering into peer pressure and the degree into access
to information, highlighting our main theoretical mechanism.
3 Model
We consider an undirected network g of N workers. Two of those workers, i, j ∈ N, are
selected in each period t. We focus here on a two period model, t ∈ {1, 2}, to keep our set
up as simple as possible but note that it is straightforward to extend our setting to more
periods. Once two workers are selected they have to complete a project. Whether they
are successful depends on their exerted effort, their network structure and past project
outcomes. In order to highlight how each of these factors matter we first consider the
game that is played in each period t.
1. Worker Selection At the beginning of each period, two workers are drawn at random
from the set of workers to complete a project. These workers can be linked directly, where
a link between i and j, denoted by gij = gji = 1, implies a good relationship between
coworkers. We assume that two workers can only complete their project successfully if
there exists a direct link between them. If there is no link between two selected workers,
their project fails with certainty, leading to zero payoff.24 The number of links of worker
i, his degree, is denoted by di. Then, the probability of being selected for a project and
being partnered with a directly connected worker is given by (see Appendix)
si =
2di
N(N − 1) .
This probability is proportional to the degree of an individual, that is workers with higher
degrees will be selected more often into potentially profitable projects.25
2. Information Every period is marked by a state of the world, θ, which can be high or
24A link or rather a good relationship between workers makes them better team partners. To simplify, we
set the payoff of projects between unlinked workers to zero.
25This is in line with Aral et al. (2012), who study project performance in a recruiting firm. They find that
peripheral nodes, i.e. nodes that are not well connected, do fewer projects per unit of time than central nodes.
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low
θ =
 θh with probability qθl with probability 1− q.
It is drawn after project teams are formed and is not observable to the workers. In the
high (low) state, the project value is 2vh (2vl), with vh > vl. We assume that the payoff of
the project is split equally among the project partners.26
In the following, we show how a worker’s network structure affects his information
about the state of the world. Each worker obtains a signal xi ∈ {0, 1} about the state,
where xi = 1 indicates the high state. Signals are informative in the sense that Pr(xi =
1|θh) = p > 12 and Pr(xi = 1|θl) = 1− p.27
Each worker receives one signal directly, but can also observe the signals of all workers
he is directly or indirectly connected to. Note that the entire network might or might not
be connected (where connected means that there are no isolated nodes). We denote the
overall number of signals a worker receives by ni. We allow for ni > N and interpret the
additional signals (i.e. the signals beyond the number of workers in the network N ) as
basic information everyone possesses, which enables us to vary the baseline amount of
information below.
Based on the observed signals, a worker can compute a sufficient statistic yi, which is
the number of high signals out of all observed signals, that is yi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ni}. Note
that for two (directly or indirectly) connected workers, i and j, yi = yj .28
As our focus is on the effects of ego-networks, we distinguish between the number of
signals a worker obtains from himself and his direct friends, nint,i = di+1 and the signals
he obtains indirectly from external sources, next,i, with ni = nint,i + next,i.29
Based on yi, the posterior probability of being in the high state, Pr(θh|yi), is computed
via Bayesian updating and thus having a higher number of signals gives a more precise
26We impose the equal split assumption as we aim for a model in which agents are perfectly symmetric
except for their network. This allows to show the effects of network structures in the cleanest way possible.
27Put differently, if θ = θh, each signal xi ∼ Bernoulli(p) and if θ = θl, this signal is xi ∼ Bernoulli(1− p).
28To be precise, let nmax = maxini. Then yi, i = 1, ..., N takes values on Y = {0, 1, . . . , nmax}.
29Ego networks consist of a focal node (ego) and the nodes to whom ego is directly connected to (friends)
plus the ties, if any, among the friends.
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posterior. The project value, pi(yi), is then given by
pi(yi) = Pr(θh|yi)vh + (1− Pr(θh|yi))vl.
To summarize, the network structure matters as a higher degree gives a higher num-
ber of internal signals, which in turn affects the expectation about the project value.
3. Choice of Effort The paired workers simultaneously choose what effort, ei ≥ 0, ∀i to
exert on the project. This effort is costly with all workers facing the same cost function
c(e). We assume quadratic costs c(e) = ke2, where k > 0. Given that the project certainly
fails if the two project partners are not connected, we focus on the effort choice of two
directly linked project partners. Effort makes project success more likely. The probability
that the project is completed is given by the success probability function f(ei, ej) ∈ [0, 1).
In order to ensure that f(ei, ej) is strictly smaller than one, we assume that effort is
bounded, ei ∈ E = [0, emax] where f(emax, emax) < 1.30 This implies that success cannot
be guaranteed. We impose the following assumptions on the success function.
Assumption 1. Success Probability Function f(ei, ej):
(a) Symmetry: ei and ej enter f(ei, ej) symmetrically.
(b) f1(ei, ej) = f2(ej , ei) > 0
(c) f11(ei, ej) = f22(ej , ei) < 0.
(d) Strict Supermodularity: f12(ei, ej) = f21(ei, ej) > 0.
(e) f(ei, 0) = f(0, ej) = 0.
(f) f(λei, λej) = λf(ei, ej), λei, λej ≤ emax.
The effort levels of the workers are complements. We focus on complements as the nat-
ural benchmark for a team problem since with substitutes a worker should complete
the project by himself, circumventing the team moral hazard problem. Additionally,
if one team member chooses zero effort, the project fails for sure. We assume further
that the success probability function exhibits constant returns to scale. We know that
ei ∈ [0, emax]. If λ ∈ [0, 1], then λei ≤ emax, and for λ > 1 we impose the additional
restriction that λei ≤ emax, ∀i. After effort has been chosen, the project outcome – success
or failure – is realized.
30By choosing an appropriate bound on vh, we can guarantee an interior solution e ≤ emax.
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These three stages occur in both periods. What differs across periods is information (i.e.
the signals workers obtain) and the effect of peer pressure (which impacts effort only if to-
day’s project outcome matters for tomorrow’s). Effort depends on information through
the sufficient statistic y. It depends on peer pressure because publicly observable past
project outcomes affect current relationships between workers, especially when the net-
work is characterized by high clustering. We now outline the peer pressure channel and
how past project outcomes matter rather informally, formal details are in the Appendix.
We assume that a failure has an impact if the same team partners are chosen in two
consecutive periods. We believe it is intuitively plausible that a project failure leads to
discord among team partners and their relationship turns ‘bad’. The failure has to be
justified, which is disagreeable and affects their relationship. We further argue that this
discord between team partners also spreads to common friends. This idea is based on
the well-established structural balance theory. According to this theory, triads of friends
are only stable as long as the relationships are balanced. Suppose that i, j and l are all
directly connected. Initially, all their relationships are ‘good’. Then, i and j work on
a project together that fails, turning their relationship into a bad one. But a triad with
one bad relationship and two good ones is unstable. This instability is resolved by the
workers taking sides. To simplify our analysis, we assume that all relationships in a triad
will be bad after a project failure.31 This is why project failures affect workers with high
clustering more than those with low clustering. They are deprived of more future project
opportunities. This sequence of events is depicted in Figure 1, where a plus (minus)
signifies a good (bad) relationship.32
Each project failure induces some bad relationships, whereas a project success means
that all directly connected workers remain in good terms. We denote the quality of the
relationship by γ ∈ {γb, γg}, that is the relationship can be good or bad. The relationship
between i and j is bad after a project failure in the previous period if either (1) i and j
were teamed in the previous period or (2) i or j were teamed with a common friend in the
31Our assumption is a simplification of the following idea: Given a project failed, a worker faces with a
positive probability more than one negative connection if he and the project partner had common friends, but
only has one negative connection if the project failed with someone he does not have a common friend with.
32Note that discord does not imply that links are cut. If there is no link between two workers, then they
never get along. Once a link exists, we interpret this as two individuals getting along in principle. Thus, a
bad link is transitory. Also, information is still transferred if the link is bad but is not if the link was cut.
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Figure 1: Structural Balance Theory
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previous period. Otherwise, i and j have a good relationship. We assume that in period
one the relationship between any two workers is good.
This relationship quality between two directly connected workers constitutes a state,
γ ∈ Γ, and we can define a pure public strategy σ(γ, y) : Γ × Y → E, which maps from
the relationship state and the signals into the action space.
Due to our restriction to public strategies, the equilibrium concept applied is that of a
public perfect equilibrium. We index the variables in the second period by prime.
Definition 1. A public perfect equilibrium (PPE) is a profile of public strategies σ that for any
state γ, γ′ ∈ Γ and for any signal realization y, y′ ∈ Y specifies a Nash equilibrium for the
repeated game, i.e. in the first period, σ(γg, y) is a Nash equilibrium and in the second period
σ′(γ′, y′) is a Nash equilibrium.
In our setting a higher degree leads to more signals, allowing for a more precise belief
about the project value. Higher clustering, on the other hand, makes a bad relationship
after a project failure more likely and therefore incentivizes effort through peer pressure.
This is the basic trade-off we are focussing on. We will show in more detail how peer
pressure influences effort choices in the dynamic setting but, before doing so, we want to
discuss the static case, where only information matters. After presenting the full model
and our results, we will justify our equilibrium selection, comparing the workers’ payoffs
from choosing this strategy to the payoffs of other strategies.
4 Static Decision Problem
In the static setting, worker i chooses effort to maximize his expected payoff, given by
max
ei∈E
f(ei, ej)pi(y)− c(ei). (1)
16
Recall that yi = yj = y since each worker observes not only his own signal but also the
signals of all workers he is (in)directly connected to, so we write pi(y). Given our assump-
tions on f(·, ·) and c(·), the first order condition of (1) is both necessary and sufficient for
a maximum. The same holds true for worker j. Based on the first order approach, we
can determine the pure strategy public perfect equilibria of the game where, to simplify
notation, we define e(y) to denote the optimal strategy based on y.
Proposition 1 (Public Perfect Equilibria Static Game). .
1. Every public perfect equilibrium is symmetric such that ei(y) = ej(y) = e(y) ∀y.
2. For each y, there exist exactly two pure public perfect equilibria.
(a) Zero effort: e(y) = 0
(b) Strictly positive effort: e(y) =
f1(1, 1)pi(y)
2k
(2)
.
All proofs are in the Appendix. Given the symmetry in our setting, in particular,
the symmetry of success function f(·, ·), identical cost functions c(·) and equal split of
the payoff, both workers will always exert the same effort in equilibrium. We further
show that the one-period problem has two pure strategy PPE. There always exists a PPE
where both project partners exert zero effort independently of signal realizations. It is
a best response to choose zero effort given the other worker has chosen zero effort as
f(ei, 0) = f(0, ej) = 0. Each team member has to exert at least some effort for the project
to be successful. But there also exists a PPE with strictly positive efforts. The uniqueness
of the positive effort equilibrium follows from supermodularity and constant returns to
scale property of f(·, ·), as well as the convexity of the cost function. In particular, we
obtain a closed form expression for effort when taking into account symmetry across
team members, where k is the multiplicative constant in the cost function and where
f1(1, 1) is a constant as well.
We are now interested in how network characteristics influence equilibrium effort
through the information channel in the static model. All else equal, a worker with a
higher degree receives more signals about the state of the world. We want to know how
effort varies with the number of signals.
It follows from (2) that effort positively depends on the project value pi(y). We focus
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on how the expected project value, E(pi(y)), varies with the number of signals as this is
the channel through which information affects effort. If additional signals increase the
expected project value, then expected effort, E(e(y)), increases as well. A worker has an
incentive to work harder if he believes the payoff for his work to be higher.
We first show that pi(y) has the martingale property, meaning that it is unaffected by
the number of signals, which follows from Bayes’ Rule. This is not true once we condition
on the state. To emphasize that a worker receives n signals, we denote the project value
by pi(yn) instead of pi(y).
Lemma 1 (Information and Expected Project Value). pi(yn) satisfies the martingale property:
pi(yn) = E(pi(yn+1)|yn). However, given that the state is realized, a worker with more signals
holds a more accurate posterior belief about the state of the world and thus about the project value:
vh > E (pi(yn+1)|θh) > E (pi(yn)|θh) vl < E (pi(yn+1)|θl) < E (pi(yn)|θl) .
The impact of an additional signal vanishes, if uncertainty vanishes, i.e. E (pi(yn)|θ) = E (pi(yn+1)|θ),
if either (i) vl → vh (ii) p→ 1, (iii) q → 1 if θ = θh, q → 0 if θ = θl, or (iv) next →∞.
An additional signal does not contain further information about the state of the world,
given the state of the world has not been realized, that is E (pi(yn)) = E (pi(yn+1)) . But
once the state of the world has been realized, this is no longer true. Since signals are
informative, the more signals are available the more accurate is the posterior belief about
the state of the world. The expected project value increases in the number of signals if
the state of the world is high and decreases in the number of signals if the state of the
world is low. This implies that, given the high state of the world, a worker with more
information expects a higher project value compared to a worker with less information.
If the low state has been realized, the reverse is true.
The expected project value becomes independent of the number of overall signals n
when the uncertainty of the underlying environment vanishes. This can happen for four
reasons: (i) There is no difference between high and low project values. (ii) The signals
are completely informative.33 (iii) A worker’s prior reflects complete certainty about the
33In fact, the expected project value also becomes independent of the number of overall signals n when
signals are completely uninformative p→ 0.5.
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state of the world. (iv) Moreover, if overall information becomes abundant, which hap-
pens when the number of external signals, next, becomes large, then in the limit, all agents
know the state of the world with certainty even if the number of signals obtained through
their ego-networks, nint, differs. The expected payoff converges to the high (low) value
when the state is high (low). In sum, the effect of additional information on the expected
project value is reinforced when the uncertainty of the underlying environment is con-
siderable and dies out when uncertainty vanishes.
Taking Lemma 1 together with equation (2), we can shed light on the effect of infor-
mation on expected effort, summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Information and Expected Effort). A worker with more information, i.e. with
a higher degree, exerts on average more (less) effort when the state of the world is high (low)
compared to a worker with less information. The impact of additional signals on effort vanishes as
the underlying uncertainty vanishes.
A worker with a higher degree and thus more signals holds more accurate informa-
tion about the state of the world. In the high state, he exerts on average higher effort
compared to a worker with lower degree. The opposite is true for the low state. Intu-
itively, workers with more accurate information, i.e. more signals, can better fine-tune
their effort to the expected project reward.
5 Dynamic Decision Problem
Having discussed the static game, we can now analyze the agents’ effort choices and how
they depend on their network characteristics in a dynamic setting. Here, not only agents’
degree but also their clustering matters for their actions as they adjust their effort to their
relationship quality, namely ∀ y′
σ′(γ′g, y
′) > 0 and σ′(γ′b, y
′) = 0.
This implies that, when two workers have a bad relationship, they exert zero effort.
We know from the static game that zero effort constitutes a PPE in every period, re-
gardless of the signals. In turn, when two team partners have a good relationship they
exert strictly positive effort. In what follows, we focus on the dynamic decision problem
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that pins down the high effort PPE in both periods. We are interested in what deter-
mines this choice.
The dynamic maximization problem of team partner i reads
max
ei,e′i
−c(ei) + f(ei, ej)
(
pi(y) + βsiE
(
f(e′i, e
′
k)pi(y
′)− c(e′i)
))
+ (1− f(ei, ej))
(
0 + βsi(1− rij)E
(
f(e′i, e
′
k)pi(y
′)− c(e′i)
))
(3)
where the expectation is taken over all possible signal realizations in period two. Prob-
lem (3) is dynamic since workers choose today’s effort not only based on the current
project payoff but also based on the second period expected payoff, taking into account
that today’s project outcome matters for tomorrow’s through its impact on relationships.
Therefore, this expected payoff of workers i and j, who are teamed up in period one,
depends not only on second period performance but also on
(i) the probability of being selected next period, si and sj , defined in the section on
worker selection,
(ii) the probability of first period project success, f(ei, ej), or failure, 1−f(ei, ej), as well as
(iii) the probability that in the next period they are doing a project with someone who
would be affected by today’s project failure, given that they are chosen for a project, rij
and rji, with rij given by
rij ≡
1 +
∑
k,k 6=i,k 6=j gikgjk
di
=
Cij
di
. (4)
The term
∑
k,k 6=i,k 6=j gikgjk denotes the number of common friends of i and j and there-
foreCij is a proxy for their common friends. Equation (4) gives the probability of workers
having a bad relationship after a failure. They are only affected by their failure if they are
chosen to do a project together again or with a common friend in the second period.
We solve problem (3) by backward induction, starting in the second period. Clearly,
the second period problem is identical to the static problem.34 Recall that the high effort
level is given by
σ′∗i (γ
′
g, y
′) ≡ arg max
e′i
Vi(γ
′
g, y
′) = arg max
e′i
[f(e′i, e
′
j)pi(y
′)− c(e′i)], (5)
34As j and k belong to the same set, namely the friends of i, we can replace k in the second period by j.
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where σ′∗i (γ
′
g, y
′) is the optimal second period effort level if the project partners have a
good history and observe signals y′ (see equation (2) for the solution to this problem).
From here onwards, we denote this equilibrium effort by e′i(y) ≡ σ′∗i (γ′g, y′). Moreover,
we denote the maximized second period payoff by V ∗i (γ
′
g, y
′). Then, the maximization
problem of agent i in the first period reads
max
ei
f(ei, ej)pi(y)− c(ei) + βsi(f(ei, ej) + (1− rij)(1− f(ei, ej)))EV ∗i (γ′g, y′) (6)
Similar to the static problem, we show that there exists a unique PPE in which both team
partners exert positive effort. The solution to (6) is given by ei(y) ≡ σ∗i (γg, y).
Proposition 3 (Public Perfect Equilibria Dynamic Game). .
1. Both project partners always exert the same effort in any PPE, that is effort is symmetric.
2. In both periods, there exists a unique PPE in which both team partners exert strictly positive
effort, ∀y, y′
ei(y) = ej(y) =
f1(1, 1)(pi(y) + βsrEV
∗(γ′g, y′))
2k
(7)
e′i(y
′) = e′j(y
′) =
f1(1, 1)pi(y
′)
2k
We already know from Proposition 1 that in the second period there exists a unique
PPE with strictly positive effort, which is symmetric. But also in the first period, effort
levels are symmetric. This is because two workers can only have the same number of
common friends, implying that sirij =
Cij
1
2
(N−1)N is constant across project partners and,
thus, βsirijEV ∗i (γ
′
g, y
′) = βsrEV ∗(γ′g, y′).35 Moreover, for y = y′ first period effort is
higher than second period effort, stemming from the dynamic effort-enhancing effect
of clustering: Having common friends creates particularly strong incentives for effort,
reducing the team moral hazard problem that causes effort to be inefficiently low.
Again, we are interested in how the agents’ network characteristics affect effort. We
first discuss the effect of degree, which impacts effort through the information channel.
35In the last period, T, the network structure does not matter, as there is no threat of bad relationships in
the future, and thus effort levels are symmetric as information is symmetric. In T − 1, when calculating the
expected value of T the workers know that the effort levels will be symmetric in T . As sr is also symmetric,
this implies that effort levels are again symmetric. However, this symmetry breaks down in T − 2. Then,
when calculating the expected value, the workers need to also take into account with whom they will be
teamed up and the sr symmetry will no longer hold.
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We then turn to the effect of clustering, which influences effort through peer pressure.
Taking expectations over first period signals in (7), it follows that information impacts
expected effort through the expected first period project value, E (pi(y)) , and second pe-
riod value, EV ∗(γ′g, y′). Both have a positive effect on effort. Recall from our discussion
on the static game that E (pi(y)) positively (negatively) depends on the number of sig-
nals if the state is high (low). To see how the expected value, EV ∗(γ′g, y′), depends on
the number of signals and thus information, we first establish that V ∗(γ′g, y′) is a convex
function of the second period project value, pi(y′) (which, in turn, is a martingale). To
simplify notation, we write EV ∗(y′) instead of EV ∗(γ′g, y′).
Lemma 2 (Information and Second Period Expected Value). V ∗(y′n) is a submartingale.
And, thus, a worker with more signals has a higher second period expected value:
E(V ∗(y′n)) < E(V
∗(y′n+1)),
The impact of an additional signal vanishes, if uncertainty vanishes, i.e. E(V ∗(y′n)) = E(V ∗(y′n+1)),
if either (i) vl → vh (ii) p→ 1 (iii) q → 1 if θ = θh, q → 0 if θ = θl, or (iv) next →∞.
To gain some intuition into this result first suppose that the additional signal is high.
This implies that effort increases, that the project value increases and that the overall
payoff, V ∗(y), increases as well. If the additional signal is low, then effort decreases, the
project value decreases and the overall payoff is lower. But due to the convexity of the
payoff, an additional positive signal has a stronger effect than an additional negative
signal. Therefore, having an additional signal increases the expected value in the second
period unless uncertainty vanishes. As in the static game (see Lemma 1), here additional
information has no impact if (i) there is no variance in the project value across states, (ii) if
signals are completely informative, (iii) if the prior is correct, or (iv) if overall information
becomes abundant. Intuitively, information only matters under uncertainty.
In turn, the effect of peer pressure, siri, on first period effort (through clustering) is
straightforward and unambiguously positive.
We summarize the effect of information and peer pressure (and thus of the agents’
network characteristics) on first period effort in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 (Information, Peer Pressure and Expected First Period Effort). More infor-
mation, i.e. a higher degree, unambiguously increases expected first period effort only if the state
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is high. Furthermore, higher peer pressure, i.e. higher clustering, increases expected first pe-
riod effort independently of the state of the world. Finally, unless uncertainty vanishes, a worker
with more information but less peer pressure better adjusts his effort to the expected project value
compared to a worker with less information and more peer pressure.
The proof follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2 and equation (7) and is therefore
omitted. Both network characteristics, high degree and high clustering, affect first period
effort and thus project completion. A higher degree improves information about the state
of the world. This information is particularly beneficial when the true state is high and, at
the same time, when the agents’ uncertainty about the state is considerable. In this case,
additional signals induce the agents to put significantly more weight on the high state,
translating into higher effort. (The same logic also applies to second period effort, given
by the static case in Proposition 2.)
In turn, clustering positively impacts first period effort through a dynamic peer pres-
sure effect. This channel is independent of the true state of the world and the underlying
uncertainty. Peer pressure induces higher effort because a potential project failure today
puts more friendships and thus future project opportunities in jeopardy. Since workers
with more information are more selective with their effort choice (depending on the state)
and workers facing peer pressure increase their effort no matter the expected payoff, it
follows that workers with a higher degree are better able to fine-tune their effort to the
project reward than workers with higher clustering. This means that their difference of
efforts across states, E(e(y)|θh)− E(e(y)|θl), is larger, which follows directly from (7).
We now turn to the agents’ wages, which are tightly linked to their effort choices. De-
note the probability of having a good relationship with the second period project partner
given first period state by
Pr(γ′g|θ) ≡ E[f (e(y), e(y)) + (1− ri)(1− f (e(y), e(y)))|θ] = E(e(y)|θ)rif(1, 1) + 1− ri.
We define first and second period wages conditional on the state as follows:
Definition 2 (Equilibrium Wages). First and second period wages for a given state are respec-
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tively defined as
wi(θ) ≡ E[f (e(y), e(y)) v|θ] = E(e(y)|θ)f(1, 1)v(θ) (8)
w′i(θ, θ
′) ≡ siPr(γ′g|θ)E[f
(
e′(y′), e′(y′)
)
v′|θ′] = siPr(γ′g|θ)E(e′(y′)|θ′)f(1, 1)v(θ′) (9)
where θ, θ′ ∈ {θl, θh} is the realized first (second) period state.
These are expected wages because even though positive effort is exerted there is no
guarantee for project success. The wages reflect that the agents obtain their share of
output in case the project is successful. We define these wages given that a certain state of
the world has materialized. The expected wage across states can then be easily computed,
e.g. E(wi) = qwi(θh) + (1− q)wi(θl).
Notice that the structure of both periods’ wages is the same, only that in the second
period, one also has to take into account the probability of being selected for a project
with someone the agent is on good terms with (i.e. the probability of having a good
friendship history with the project partner, given by Pr(γ′g|θ)). Since friendship histories
matter, the second period expected payoff depends not only on contemporaneous effort
but also on first period effort.
Both periods’ wages are increasing in effort, highlighting the tight link between the
agents’ actions and their rewards. As a consequence, Propositions 2 and 4 on the effects
of network characteristics on effort give insights into how degree and clustering affect
the agents’ wages. We summarize these results in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 (Information, Peer Pressure and Wages). More information, i.e. a higher de-
gree, unambiguously increases first and second period wages only if the state is high in both
periods. The effect vanishes as uncertainty vanishes. In turn, peer pressure, i.e. higher clustering,
increases the first period wage independently of the state but has an ambiguous effect on second
period wage.
These results follow from Propositions 2 and 4 and wage Definition 2. Information
(and thus a high degree) leads to a significant boost in effort and wages if the underly-
ing state of the world is high because agents want to reap the benefits of a high project
value.36 Through the effort channel, information only increases wages if there is uncer-
tainty about the state of the world. In turn, when the agent faces a dynamic decision
36If the state is low, it is ambiguous whether clustering or degree leads to a higher wage.
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problem (i.e. in the first period), higher clustering unambiguously increases effort and
wages through peer pressure, independent of the state and underlying uncertainty. Only
in the second period, the effect on wages is ambiguous: Peer pressure leads to higher first
period effort (increasing Pr(γ′g|θ)), but many common friends also make a non-intact re-
lationship with the second period team partner more likely (decreasing Pr(γ′g|θ)).
While this discussion has focussed on comparative statics effects of a single network
characteristic holding other network characteristics fixed, we now turn to the more inter-
esting but also more involved case of comparing two types of workers: one with higher
degree but lower clustering (denoted as D-worker) and one with lower degree but more
clustering (denoted as C-worker).
Proposition 6 (Trade-Off Between Information and Peer Pressure). Suppose that vl = 0. (i)
Wage Dynamics: If a C-worker has a lower first period wage than a D-worker, then he also expects
a lower wage in the second period, even if second period uncertainty vanishes. This wage gap
arises even if both workers perform equally well in the first period. (ii) Comparative Advantage:
If E(pi(y)|θh) and EV ∗(y′) are sufficiently concave in information n, signal precision p, or the
prior belief q, C-Workers hold a comparative advantage in environments with less uncertainty,
that is, E(w
C)
E(wD)
increases as uncertainty becomes smaller.
We make these statements precise in the Appendix where all the formal conditions are
provided. Our model predicts a strong impact of early career wages on the future wage
trajectory through peer pressure, which puts workers with high clustering but low in-
formation into disadvantage. Notice that wage gaps between C-workers and D-workers
arise even if they exert the same effort in the first period. Moreover, if these wage gaps
exist in the first period, they persist in the second period even if they perform equally
well (i.e. even if uncertainty vanishes in the second period).
Our model also predicts that workers with higher clustering and less information
have a comparative advantage in environments characterized by less uncertainty compared
to workers with less clustering and more information. That is, the ratio of expected
wages of C-workers to D-workers increases when uncertainty diminishes, which hap-
pens when either the amount of overall information, n, increases, when signals become
more informative (for p sufficiently large), or when the prior belief q becomes more cor-
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rect.37 This is consistent with our previous predictions: Clustering gains importance as
uncertainty vanishes.
Our framework allows us to rank networks according to effort choices and wages for
different underlying environments. We now connect our theoretical predictions with our
empirical finding that men have a higher degree and women more clustering.
6 Performance of Men versus Women
In this section, we use our model to analyze how peer pressure and information influence
performance and wages of men versus women. We show that these results are consis-
tent with various observed gender differences in labor market outcomes. Previously, we
showed that women have a higher clustering coefficient and a lower degree than men,
that is, they face more peer pressure but are less informed. We therefore want to compare
agents with these features. To do so, we fix the number of links and nodes in the network,
so additional clustering comes at the cost of a lower degree and vice versa. Thus, there
is a trade-off between degree and clustering which then translates into a trade-off be-
tween peer pressure and access to information and it is not a-priori clear which network
characteristic is more conducive to project success and wages.
In what follows, we use our model to predict in which environments men outperform
women and show that these predictions are in line with the following empirical facts.
1. Wage and performance gaps between men and women are especially large within occupations
and tasks characterized by uncertainty like in the financial sector, film-industry and basic research.
In most developed countries, the gender wage gap is still large. In the US in 2012,
for instance, women’s earnings were 80.9% of men’s earnings.38 Part of it can be ex-
plained by differences in occupational choices where women select into low-paying oc-
cupations while men go into high-paying jobs. However, even within occupations wage
gaps are considerable. Notably, some occupations are more affected than others. In the
37In the Appendix, we show that the ratio E(w
C)
E(wD)
is strictly increasing as uncertainty decreases. Hence, the
result clearly holds for positive but small vl. In simulations, we also allow for vl >> 0: When project values,
vl and vh, become more similar across states, then the ratio of expected wages of C-workers to D-workers
increases. See Figure 2 in the Appendix.
38See http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2012.pdf
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US, the within-occupational wage gap is pronounced in management occupations, espe-
cially for financial managers and chief executives where female earnings are respectively
70.3% and 76% of male’s, as well as in business and financial operations occupations
where women earn 74% of men’s earnings. In contrast, the wage gap is much smaller in
healthcare support and administration where women’s earnings are respectively 90.2%
and 89.9% of men’s.39 A similar pattern was found in the UK, where full-time working
women in the financial sector earn 55% less than full-time male workers – a gap twice
as large as the gap in the economy as a whole.40 In addition, the evidence suggests that
women’s lower earnings in financial management and executives occupations are espe-
cially due to large differences in performance pay and bonuses.41
Another well-studied sector where gender inequalities persist is the film industry
(Lutter (2012) and Lutter (2013)). This industry is highly project-based where tasks in-
volve little routine work and have uncertain outcomes. Ferriani et al. (2009) argue that
the film market requires constant adjustment to new work environments since film ven-
tures operate under constant uncertainty and have to foresee ex-ante whether the project
opportunity is valuable. Women in this sector generate lower box revenues from movies,
which is a direct measure of performance.
Last, an area well-known for gender disparities is the market for patents. Hunt et al.
(2012) document that women in the US are much less likely to be granted a patent than
men, with women holding only 5.5% of commercialized patents. This is not due to
women’s underrepresentation in science and engineering degrees but due to their un-
derrepresentation in patent-intensive fields of study as well as patent-intensive job tasks
like design and development. Again, patents can be seen as measures of performance.
This implies that the gender wage gap is particularly pronounced in occupations or
tasks characterized by a large amount of uncertainty, commonly measured by earnings
variability. Income is based on success which is difficult to foresee. Earnings of executives
and financial managers are largely based on performance pay. Similarly, the success of
research (and patents) as well as movies is difficult to foresee at the time of production.
Our model provides a new mechanism why men outperform women under uncer-
39See BLS-Reports (2013), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2012.pdf
40Wage differences are considerable even when controlling for hours of work (full time) and type of job.
See the report by the Equality and H.R.Commission (2009).
41See the report by the Equality and H.R.Commission (2009).
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tainty. The main prediction is that men’s network structure is conducive to information
acquisition which is more valuable in such environments than the undifferentiated effort-
enhancing effect of women’s peer pressure.
Our network-based view finds support in various empirical studies on financial and
management occupations, the film industry and patenting. Forret and Dougherty (2004)
analyze the impact of networking activities on career outcomes (promotions, total com-
pensation and perceived career success) of male and female MBA graduates over 35 years
in the U.S. Those graduates take on positions in management, finance, marketing and
other professional jobs – occupations characterized by relatively large amounts of earn-
ings variability. They find that only for men, network activities positively affect career
outcomes. The authors speculate that the reason for this finding is that women network
less effectively. We propose a theory why women’s networks are less effective in these
settings.
As far as the film industry is concerned, Ferriani et al. (2009) argue that information
is crucial to identify potentially successful scripts and to assemble the right project team.
Based on the finding that producers who are more central in their network (i.e., have
more access to information) are more likely to increase the box revenue from a movie,
the authors conclude that social networks provide crucial access to information. In a sim-
ilar vein, Lutter (2013) documents that women with loose information-based networks
perform better in the film-industry than women with dense networks, supporting our
hypothesis that information is the key to success in uncertain environments.
With regards to research and development, Gabbay and Zuckerman (1998) document
that in basic research, which is typically characterized by complex, uncertain tasks, scien-
tists benefit from sparse networks with many holes, whereas in applied research, which
is typically characterized by non-complex, certain tasks, scientists benefit from dense net-
works. Supporting this view, Ding et al. (2006b) argue that an important reason for the
gender wage gap in patenting is that women’s networks are less effective: In relying
more on close relationships, they lack reach to industry contacts.
Our theory offers a unified explanation for these findings. In uncertain environ-
ments, information is crucial for success and men hold more of this type of social cap-
ital than women. We show next that this argument also provides a rationale for why
occupational choices differ across gender.
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2. More men than women choose occupations with high earnings volatility.
Dohmen and Falk (2011) show that men rather than women select into “risky” jobs
that are characterized by performance pay and high earnings volatility. They explain this
finding, arguing that men and women face the same mean-variance trade-off with regards
to wages in all occupations but differ in their attitude towards risk (with men being less
risk-averse). We offer an alternative explanation, which is based on comparative advan-
tage. Our model predicts that women have a comparative advantage in environments
characterized by lower uncertainty.
In such environments, women put relatively more effort than men, translating into
relatively higher earnings, compared to more uncertain environments. In turn, in un-
certain environments, men tend to face more income dispersion but are compensated
for this risk by higher expected wages. We do not model occupational choice explicitly
but this argument suggests that women would select into environments with low uncer-
tainty whereas the opposite is true for men. Notably, this holds even though both men
and women are risk-neutral and hence do not differ in their risk attitudes.
3. Having women in the network is particularly beneficial high up in the organizational hierarchy.
Lalanne and Seabright (2011) document empirically that having females in the net-
work is beneficial to both male and female executives but not to agents at lower levels
in the organizational hierarchy. We believe that networks at high levels of the hierarchy
are considerably larger than at lower levels. Hence, information is particularly scarce at
the beginning of the career but abundant at the executive level. The more information
there is, the lower is the uncertainty about the true state, making men’s additional in-
formation less valuable. To the contrary, women bring closure to the network, which is
particularly beneficial once a sufficient amount of information is available. Therefore, in
line with Lalanne and Seabright (2011), our model predicts that at management levels,
it is especially profitable to have women in the team because, in environments saturated
with information, women’s peer pressure kicks in more strongly than men’s additional
information.
Walker et al. (1997) provides additional support for this view, arguing that sparse
networks are most important at the beginning of the network formation process. They
analyze the changing value of social capital over the life cycle of inter-firm networks and
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find that being at a position that bridges a structural hole is more valuable at early stages
of network formation, since most tasks of the early networks are informational. How-
ever, as the network becomes established, densely connected network relationships and
closure become more valuable than brokerage opportunities. In a similar vein, Ferriani
et al. (2009) show that producers in the film industry who are more central in the network
(i.e., have more access to information) are more likely to increase the box revenue from
a movie but that returns to centrality become smaller the more central the producer is.
Our theory sheds light on the diminishing returns to network reach (i.e. to degree) and
provides a mechanism for why the different types of social capital that emerge from tight
and lose networks are complementary.
4. During recessions men’s unemployment exceeds women’s unemployment.
Albanesi and Sahin (2013) find that this is true even when controlling for sectors.
Employers seem to have a preference for keeping woman on their workforce during re-
cessions, a pattern our model can help understand. Our model predicts that women
do particularly well when rewards are low, which we believe is the case in economic
downturns. Men’s additional information leads to a particular advantage if the state of
the world is high. In this case, they are more certain than woman that the true state is
high, leading to extra effort. The opposite is true in the low state where men assign a
higher probability to the low state than women, leading to lower effort. In turn, women
take into account that project failures hit them particularly hard because, due to more
common friends, failures destroy more second period project opportunities. This effect
pushes up women’s effort independently of the state of the world.
We thus argue that women perform relatively better than men in recessions because
they remain productive even if rewards are low. In contrast, men are more selective in
their effort choice and better adjust their effort to the expected project value. They put
low effort for low value.
5. The beginning of the career is the most decisive period for the gender wage gap formation.
Several studies point out the importance of the gender wage gap at early stages of
the career for the future wage path (Babcock and Laschever (2003), Gerhart and Rynes
(1991), Martell et al. (1996)). Bertrand et al. (2010a) document that, already 5 years into
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the career, the gender wage gap among MBAs in the US is substantial and keeps growing
thereafter. Napari (2006) shows that in Finland, early years after labor market entry have
the largest impact on gender wage differences. Thereafter, the wage gap simply persists.
Similar findings are documented for Germany, where the entry wage gap is already 25%
(Kunze (2003)).
Our model predicts a strong impact of the performance at the beginning of the career
on the future income trajectory of men relative to women. This is because the second
period wage does not only depend on the contemporaneous project outcome but also on
first period performance. This effect is particularly important for women. Due to their
higher clustering, they would lose more second period project opportunities in case of
first period project failure even if first period performance is equal across gender. More-
over, a first period wage gap would persist even if there is no uncertainty in the second
period. The reason is that women are more likely to be teamed up with someone who
punishes them for a previous failure by exerting low effort.
7 Equilibrium Selection
In our analysis, we have selected the equilibrium that induces workers to play high ef-
fort if their relationship is good and zero effort if their relationship is bad. Alternatively,
agents could choose to play the static high effort PPE each period, independently of their
relationship. Another possibility is to select zero effort independently of past project out-
comes and signals.42 We evaluate these different equilibria according to their expected
payoffs. We find that if workers always choose the payoff maximizing equilibrium, then
the zero effort equilibrium will never be played. Men will do even better in volatile envi-
ronments, whereas women keep their advantage in environments with little uncertainty,
leaving our predictions of Section 6 unchanged.
In order to see this, we define the individual payoffs from choosing the static high
42Obviously, there are other equilibria, such as whenever a project fails, all relationships in the network
turn bad and then all players choose zero effort. Another possibility is that a good relationship leads to zero
effort and a bad relationship to positive effort. We find these equilibria hard to justify and therefore use the
static PPE as a benchmark. Further, endogenizing the equilibrium selection is beyond the scope of this work.
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effort PPE and from our proposed strategy, respectively:
W stati =si(1 + β)E
[
f(e′(y), e′(y))pi(y)− c(e′(y))] , (10)
W dyni =siE [f(e(y), e(y))pi(y)− c(e(y))]
+ siβE [(1− r(1− f(e(y), e(y))))]E
[
f(e′(y′), e′(y′))pi(y′)− c(e′(y′))] . (11)
The equilibrium we select yields a higher payoff than the static PPE whenever W dyni >
W stati . To simplify notation, we let EV1 = E [f(e(y), e(y))pi(y)− c(e(y))] and EV2 =
E [f(e′(y′), e′(y′))pi(y′)− c(e′(y′))]. Welfare under our strategy, W dyni , is higher than wel-
fare in the static high effort PPE, W stati , whenever
EV1 − EV2 > βr(1− E[f(e(y), e(y))])EV2 (12)
So, ifEV1−EV2 > 0 andE[f(e(y), e(y))] is sufficiently large, then welfare is higher under
our strategy.43 An example for which equation (12) holds is given in the Appendix.
Notice that E[f(e(y), e(y))] is large if effort is high under any signal realization. Effort
does not vary greatly with the different signal realizations if the project values across
states are similar, implying little uncertainty in the environment. We have shown that
women exert higher effort than men in these environments, see Proposition (4).
If agents always play the strategy that yields the highest payoff, then in an environ-
ment with high uncertainty the static high effort PPE will be selected, whereas in an
environment with low uncertainty and relatively high payoffs, our proposed strategy is
implemented. But this implies that the differences between men and women, which we
discussed in Section 6, remain unchanged. Women would do even worse than men in
uncertain environments than under our strategy and perform the same in situations with
low uncertainty and high payoffs.
Last, notice that the payoff maximizing equilibrium might not be selected. If a worker
exerts positive effort, but his team partner shirks and only exerts zero effort, then he will
face a loss. So, if there is a possibility of miscoordination it might be better to always
choose zero effort. Whether the expected payoff maximizing equilibrium or the zero
43Note that EV1 − EV2 > 0 might not always be the case, although e > e′. To see this we consider the
example given in Table 6 in the Appendix, where EV1 < EV2. The reason is that workers choose very high
effort in the first period even if the project does not yield a payoff in order to avoid having a bad relationship
in the second period.
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effort equilibrium is selected is related to the question of whether the payoff or the risk
dominant strategy will be played. The evidence for this is mixed at best (Van Huyck et al.
(1990), Cooper et al. (1990), Cooper et al. (1992)).
We believe that it is plausible to assume that workers risk to choose the high effort
which can potentially result in a loss when they trust their project partner after a good
history and that they go for the strategy that ensures a nonnegative profit after a loss and
thus bad history.
8 Conclusion
We identify a new dimension of heterogeneity between men and women, namely differ-
ences in their networks structure, and connect these differences to discrepancies in their
labor market outcomes. We first establish that men have a higher degree than women,
whereas women have a higher clustering coefficient. Based on this, we build a model
that sheds light on the relative advantages of having a male network (high degree, low
clustering) versus a female network (low degree, high clustering). A higher clustering
coefficient implies higher peer pressure, whereas a higher degree improves access to in-
formation. Both peer pressure and access to information can attenuate a team moral
hazard problem in the workplace. But whether peer pressure or access to information is
more important depends on the work environment. We find that, in environments where
uncertainty is high, information is crucial and, therefore, men outperform women. This
uncertainty can either stem from large payoff variability, moderately informative signals,
a small number of overall signals or little prior knowledge about the state of the world.
Our findings are in line with large gender wage gaps in occupations characterized by
uncertainty and with the fact that more men than women choose occupations with high
earnings volatility, where volatility can be interpreted as uncertainty. Additionally, it is
documented that having women in the network is beneficial once there is an abundance
of information. Our model suggests that this is due to women adding network closure
which is more beneficial under these circumstances than additional information. Further,
it is documented that women have a higher employment rate in recessions when rewards
are low, which our model would also predict. Last, our model is consistent with empirical
findings of how the gender wage gap changes over the career paths, with a strong impact
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of the early career wage gap on future wage trajectories of men and women.
We propose a novel, network-based explanation for gender differences in labor mar-
ket outcomes. We see this approach complementary to other explanations, such as differ-
ences in preferences, risk aversion, bargaining behavior and discrimination. Ideally, we
would like to test our theory empirically in order to quantify the impact of network dif-
ferences on wages. However, data requirements are significant. We would need a dataset
of informal networks at the workplace. We are aware of no such dataset at this moment
and leave this question for future research.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the source of network differences be-
tween men and women. There could be an underlying trait that makes women choose
more closed networks, such as risk aversion, which also leads them to choose different
occupations. But the network structure could also emerge due to differences in games
boys and girls play. Whereas boys tend to play in big groups, girls are encouraged to
socialize in a different manner already from an early age onwards. So the question is
whether friendship formation is guided by an innate trait or a trait that is learned.
Last, at its current stage, we do not use our model to study the optimal composition
of a team. The optimal team composition should depend on the network structures of
the team members. We believe that this is an interesting extension of our research, which
we aim to address in future work.
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Data Appendix
Friendship Networks
The friendship information in the AddHealth data set is based upon actual friends nom-
inations. Students were asked to name up to 5 male and female friends. Students named
friends both from the school they attend as well as friends from outside the school. Some
of the friends, who do not attend the same school attend a sister school44 and can still
be identified. The other friends cannot be identified and are dropped subsequently from
the sample.45
Descriptive Statistics AddHealth
Table 3: Differences in Degree and Clustering for Men and Women
Male Students Female Students
Mean Std Dev. Min Max Mean Std Dev. Min Max
Cl. Coeff. 0.117 0.195 0 1 0.130 0.195 0 1
Cl. Coeff. (dir.) 0.0876 0.151 0 1 0.0996 0.154 0 1
In Degree 3.597 3.554 0 37 3.917 3.482 0 34
Out Degree 3.417 3.660 0 10 4.100 3.651 0 10
Degree 7.014 5.921 0 44 8.017 5.970 0 43
Age 15.08 1.719 10 19 14.92 1.702 10 19
Size/1000 1.196 0.678 0.0290 2.982 1.200 0.686 0.0290 2.982
Observations 54881 53240
Estimation Results
We estimate whether gender has a significant influence on degree as well as on the clus-
tering coefficients. We standardize all of our measures in order to improve the inter-
pretability of our results. Further, we normalize the age by subtracting 16. In all our
regressions, we also control for school, which serves to capture location effects as well
as time differences from when the data was collected. Note that we are not interested in
determining which other factors influence these network characteristics, as is done e.g.
44A sister school is a school in the same community. So, if in a community there is a high school and a
middle school, then the high school is the sister school of the middle school and the middle school is the
sister school of the high school.
45Overall, less than 10% of the observations are dropped. We believe this to not be a problem as we are
interested in a proxy for the friendship network at the workplace, not for the entire friendship network of
individuals.
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in Conti et al. (2013).46 The purpose of this estimation is only to show that men’s and
women’s networks differ. Our results are given in Table 4.
We find that girls have a significantly higher clustering coefficient, independently of
how the clustering coefficient is measured. Both younger and older girls have a higher
clustering coefficient, i.e. this characteristic does not change as students grow older. Girls
also have a higher in and out degree as well as overall degree. But older girls have a
lower absolute degree, out degree and in degree than younger girls, i.e. unlike with the
clustering coefficients this property changes as girls mature. However, the degree does
not change much for boys as they grow older. When just taking into consideration the
oldest students, i.e. those aged 18 and 19, which are the students we are most interested
in as we are interested in the network properties of men and women, girls have a lower
in, out and overall degree.47
Technical Appendix A
Derivation of si
The probability that one agent is chosen is given by Pr(K) = N−11
2
N(N−1) =
2
N , and the
probability that this agent i is linked to the suggested project partner j, given that he
is selected by Pr(gij = 1|K) = diN−1 . Then, the probability of being chosen and being
partnered with a friend is
si ≡ Pr(gij = 1 ∧K) = Pr(gij = 1|K)Pr(K) = 2di
N(N − 1) .
Relationship Quality
We outline here formally how a project outcome affects the relationships of workers.
As mentioned previously, whether the project of workers i and j was a success, S, or a
failure, F is publicly observable and denoted by ω ∈ Ω = {S, F} × {1, 2, . . . , N}2. As an
46Conti et al. (2013) take the in-degree of high school students and find that wages 35 years are influenced
by how often students were named as friends. They argue that a high in-degree is a measure of social
skills, of how good someone is in building positive personal relationships and in adjusting to a certain
environment and situation. They also provide evidence that the in-degree manages to capture something
other than personality, by controlling for personality traits. Similarly, we use the network as a measure of
social skills that can still impact outcomes later on.
47As we have standardized the clustering coefficients as well as degrees, the coefficients can be interpreted
in terms of standard deviations.
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Table 4: Differences in Degree and Clustering for Men and Women
Cl. Coeff. (dir.) Cl. Coeff. (dir.) Cl. Coeff. Cl. Coeff. In Degree In Degree Out Degree Out Degree Degree Degree
Female 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0729∗∗∗ 0.0922∗∗∗ 0.0612∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.00565) (0.0107) (0.00563) (0.0106) (0.00683) (0.0144) (0.00609) (0.0123) (0.00634) (0.0131)
Age-16 0.00440 -0.000773 0.00456 -0.000780 -0.0173∗∗∗ 0.00629 -0.0500∗∗∗ -0.0375∗∗∗ -0.0410∗∗∗ -0.0193∗∗∗
(0.00249) (0.00292) (0.00252) (0.00296) (0.00271) (0.00335) (0.00247) (0.00304) (0.00255) (0.00313)
Size/1000 0.0310 0.0235 -0.0170 -0.0224 0.0420 0.0329 0.0339 0.0240 0.0457 0.0342
(0.0634) (0.0631) (0.0750) (0.0748) (0.0571) (0.0578) (0.0839) (0.0831) (0.0714) (0.0707)
Female*Age 16-17 0.0668∗∗∗ 0.0594∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.0443∗∗∗ -0.0878∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0121) (0.0108) (0.0113)
Female*Age 18-19 -0.0360 -0.0126 -0.356∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.342∗∗∗
(0.0253) (0.0258) (0.0221) (0.0230) (0.0225)
Female*Size/1000 0.0122 0.00858 0.0148 0.0169 0.0192∗
(0.00901) (0.00896) (0.00991) (0.00911) (0.00936)
Constant 0.0767 0.0842 0.186 0.190 -0.242∗ -0.210 0.165 0.189 -0.0410 -0.00819
(0.127) (0.126) (0.151) (0.150) (0.114) (0.116) (0.169) (0.168) (0.144) (0.142)
Additional Controls: School Fixed Effects
Observations 84792 84792 84792 84792 84792 84792 84792 84792 84792 84792
R2 0.198 0.199 0.205 0.205 0.132 0.134 0.170 0.170 0.205 0.207
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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example, if ω = S12, this means that a project was successfully completed by workers
1 and 2. We condition also on the workers who carried out the project as we do not
only care about whether the project was successful but also about the workers who were
involved. Each project failure induces some bad relationships in the network g. The
network that contains the links that signify a bad relationship is denoted by gb ⊂ g. The
specific network gb that arises after Fij, that is a project failure between workers i and
j, where gij = 1, is given by gb(Fij) = {{ij, il, jl}|gil = 1 ∧ gjl = 1,∀l}. Workers i and
j have a bad relationship with each other if their joint project fails. But a worker l, who
is connected to both i and j also has a bad relationship with both of them. Denote by
gg(Fij) = g\gb(Fij) the good relationships in the network g. Let γg ∈ gg and γb ∈ gb.
Further, for any i, j gg(Sij) = g.
Equilibrium Selection
An example for which equation (12) holds is given in Table 5. We assume f(ei, ej) =
√
ei, ej and c(ei) = 12e
2
i . In this example, men exert on average lower effort than women,
in both states of the world. This is not surprising given that the project value in both
states of the world is fairly similar.
Table 5: Welfare Parameters
vl vh p q β d
W dM CW CM N
1.5 1.6 0.75 0.5 0.9 2 3 2 1 4
Technical Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Static Decision Problem
Given the assumptions on f(., .), there always exists an equilibrium where both project
partners exert zero effort. It therefore remains to be shown that there exists exactly one
equilibrium with ei = ej > 0.
We first show symmetry. From the first order conditions we obtain
f1(ei, ej)
f2(ei, ej)
=
c′(ei)
c′(ej)
(13)
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Suppose, by contradiction, that effort levels are not symmetric and assume that ej >
ei. Due to convexity of the cost functions, the RHS of (13) is smaller than one. Due
to concavity and supermodularity of the effort function, we have f1(ei, ej) > f2(ei, ej),
which is why the LHS is larger than one, which gives the contradiction.
Further, there is exactly one equilibrium where both workers exert strictly positive
effort. It suffices to show that the FOCs (which under symmetry become a function of
one variable) have one zero under the condition that effort is strictly positive.
f1(e, e)pi(y) = c
′(e) (14)
Due to our assumption of constant returns to scale, f1(e, e) is constant in e. By our as-
sumption of quadratic costs, the first derivative of the cost function c′(e) is linear in e and
starts in the origin. Hence, the two functions have a unique intersection, implying one
symmetric equilibrium with strictly positive effort.
Proof of Lemma 1:
pi(y) has the martingale property:
pi(yn) = Pr(θh|yn)vh + (1− Pr(θh|yn))vl
Define ψn ≡ Pr(θh|yn). We know that the stochastic process {ψn} is a martingale as
E(ψn+1|yn) = E(E(ψ|yn+1)|yn) = E(ψ|yn) = ψn,
where the second equality follows from the tower property of conditional expectations.
Then,
E(pi(yn+1)|yn) = E(ψn+1vh + (1− ψn+1)vl|yn) = E(ψn+1vh|yn) + E((1− ψn+1)vl|yn)
= ψnvh + (1− ψn)vl = pi(yn)
Properties of E (pi(yn)) and E (pi(yn)|θ):
1. The number of signals do not matter for E(pi(y)) due to the martingale property of
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pi(y),
E(pi(yn+1)) = E(E(pi(yn+1)|yn)) = E(pi(yn)).
2. We note that the posterior is given by
Pr(θh|y) = Pr(y|θh)Pr(θh)
Pr(θh)Pr(y|θh) + Pr(θl)Pr(y|θl) =
qpy(1− p)n−y
qpy(1− p)n−y + (1− q)pn−y(1− p)y
=
1
1 + 1−qq
(
1−p
p
)2y−n (15)
To simplify notation we define p˜ ≡ 1−pp , q˜ ≡ 1−qq and yˆ ≡ 2y−n. Then, ψn = Pr(θh|y) = 11+q˜p˜yˆ .
We are interested in showing that
E (pi(yn+1)|θh) > E (pi(yn)|θh) (16)
E (pi(yn+1)|θl) < E (pi(yn)|θl) (17)
We will show that equation (16) holds and leave the proof of equation (17) to the reader.
We can rewrite equation (16) and we obtain
(vh − vl)E ((ψn+1 − ψn)|θh) > 0
As (vh−vl) > 0, by assumption, it remains to be shown that E (ψn+1 − ψn|θh) > 0.Given
θ = θh, ψn+1 =
1
1+q˜p˜yˆ+1
with probability p and ψn+1 = 11+q˜p˜yˆ−1 , with probability (1 − p).
We can show that
1
1 + q˜p˜yˆ
<
p
1 + q˜p˜yˆ+1
+
1− p
1 + q˜p˜yˆ−1
⇔ pp˜2 + (1− p)− p˜ < q˜p˜yˆ(p+ (1− p)p˜2 − p˜)
Note that pp˜2 + (1 − p) − p˜ = 0. Then, 0 < q˜p˜yˆ(p + (1 − p)p˜2 − p˜), which holds for p > 12
and concludes the proof.
Additional signals do not matter in the following cases:
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(i) For vl → vh,
lim
vl→vh
E (pi(yn)|θh) =
n∑
y=0
(n)!
y!(n− y)!
(
py(1− p)n−y) vh = (p+ 1− p)nvh = vh,
where the second step follows from the binomial formula. The expression is indepen-
dent of n and therefore additional signals do not matter. Similarly, this also holds for
E (pi(y)|θl).
(ii) Assume p→ 1. Then,
lim
p→1
E (pi(yn)|θh) = lim
p→1
n∑
y=0
(n)!
y!(n− y)!
(
py(1− p)n−y)(qpy(1− p)n−yvh + (1− q)pn−y(1− p)yvl
qpy(1− p)n−y + (1− q)pn−y(1− p)y
)
= lim
p→1
(n)!
n!(n− n)!
(
pn(1− p)n−n)(qpn(1− p)n−nvh + (1− q)pn−n(1− p)nvl
qpn(1− p)n−n + (1− q)pn−n(1− p)n
)
= lim
p→1
pn
(
qpnvh + (1− q)(1− p)nvl
qpn + (1− q)(1− p)n
)
= vh,
and analogue for θ = θl.
(iii) Assume q → 1. Then,
lim
q→1
E (pi(yn)|θh) =
n∑
y=0
(n)!
y!(n− y)!
(
py(1− p)n−y) vh = (p+ 1− p)nvh = vh
which is independent of n. Similarly for q → 0 and E (pi(y)|θl).
(iv) Note that y ∼ Binomial(np, np(1− p)) if θ = θh and y ∼ Binomial(n(1− p), np(1− p))
if θ = θl. Then, limn→∞(y − (n − y)) = ∞ if θ = θh and limn→∞(y − (n − y)) = −∞ if
θ = θl. To see this note that y − (n− y) = 2y − n. By the central limit theorem, as n→∞,
if θ = θh y
p→ np ⇒ lim
n→∞(2np− n) =∞
if θ = θl y
p→ n(1− p) ⇒ lim
n→∞(2n(1− p)− n) = −∞.
Then, limn→∞ Pr(θh|y) = 1 if θ = θh and limn→∞ Pr(θh|y) = 0 if θ = θl as
lim
n→∞Pr(θh|y) = limn→∞
1
1 + 1−qq
(
1−p
p
)2y−n
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We have already shown that Pr(θh|y) is increasing in n if θ = θh and decreasing in n
if θ = θl. Thus we can apply the Monotone Convergence Theorem, which implies that
limn→∞E(Pr(θh|y)vh) = E(limn→∞ Pr(θh|y)vh). From this it follows that limn→∞E (pi(y)|θh) =
vh and limn→∞E (pi(y)|θl) = vl.
Proof of Lemma 2:
V ∗(y′) is a Submartingale: We can express V ∗(y′) as a function of pi(y′), and write
V ∗(y′) ≡ g(pi(y′)) (18)
As pi(y′) is a martingale, we know that when g is a convex function, then g(pi(y′)) is a
submartingale whenever E(V ∗(y′n)) < ∞, which is always fulfilled as 0 ≤ E(V ∗(y′n)) <
vh ∀n.
Note that the equilibrium effort depends the expected project payoff through the sig-
nals, or e′(′y). We mostly omit this dependence here in order to keep notation simple but
write simply e′.
Applying the envelope theorem repeatedly, the first and second derivative of g are
given by
∂g(pi(y))
∂pi(y)
= f2(e
′, e′)pi(y′)
∂e′
∂pi(y′)
+ f(e′, e′)
∂2g(pi(y′))
∂pi(y′)∂pi(y′)
= [f22(e
′, e′) + f12(e′, e′)]pi(y′)
(
∂e′
∂pi(y′)
)2
+ f2(e
′, e′)pi(y′)
∂2e′
∂pi(y′)∂pi(y′)
+ f2(e
′, e′)
∂e′
∂pi(y′)
+ (f1(e
′, e′) + f2(e′, e′))
∂e′
∂pi(y′)
= f2(e
′, e′)pi(y′)
∂2e′
∂pi(y′)∂pi(y′)
+ f2(e
′, e′)
∂e′
∂pi(y′)
+ (f1(e
′, e′) + f2(e′, e′))
∂e′
∂pi(y′)
From first order condition of the static problem, evaluated at the equilibrium effort, we
can compute
∂e′
∂pi(y′)
=
f1(e
′, e′)
c′′(e′)
> 0
∂2e′
∂pi(y′)∂pi(y′)
=
(f11(e
′, e′) + f21(e′, e′)) ∂e
′
∂pi(y)
c′′(e′)
= 0
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It follows that
∂2g(pi(y′))
∂pi(y′)∂pi(y′)
= f2(e
′, e′)
∂e′
∂pi(y′)
+ (f1(e
′, e′) + f2(e′, e′))
∂e′
∂pi(y′)
> 0,
which implies that V ∗(y′n) is a submartingale.
Properties ofE(V ∗n ) =
∑n
y=0
n!
(y)!(n−y)!(qp
y(1−p)n−y+(1−q)pn−y(1−p)y) (f(e′, e′)pi(y)− c(e′))
(i) vl → vh.
We are interested in
lim
vl→vh
E(V ∗n ) = limvl→vh
n∑
y=0
n!
(y)!(n− y)! (qp
y(1− p)n−y + (1− q)pn−y(1− p)y) (f(e′(y′), e′(y′))pi(y′)− c(e′(y′))) ,
where e′(y′) is the equilibrium effort for given y′. As the other terms are constant in
vl, all that matters is
lim
vl→vh
(
f(e′(y′), e′(y′))pi(y′)− c(e′(y′))) = lim
vl→vh
f(e′(y′), e′(y′)) lim
vl→vh
pi(y′)− lim
vl→vh
c(e′(y′))
= lim
vl→vh
f(e′(y′), e′(y′))vh − lim
vl→vh
c(e′(y′))
Note that limpi(y′)→vh e
′(y′) = e′vh , i.e. the effort converges to some constant as pi(y
′)→ vh
since e′(y′) is a linear function of pi(y′) (see (2)). Also, due to constant returns to scale,
f(e′(y′), e′(y′)) = e′(y′)f(1, 1) and thus lime′(y′)→e′vh f(e
′(y′), e′(y′)) = e′vhf(1, 1), which
again is constant in n. As f(., .) is continuous, i.e. f(e′vh , e
′
vh
) = e′vhf(1, 1), we know that
limpi(y′)→vh f(e
′(y′), e′(y′)) = e′vhf(1, 1). The argument is similar for c(.). Then, we can
write
lim
vl→vh
(
f(e′(y′), e′(y′))pi(y′)− c(e′(y′))) = bvl ,
where bvl is constant and thus independent of n. Therefore, as vl converges to vh, the
expected second period value converges to a constant and is independent of the number
of signals,
lim
vl→vh
E(V ∗n ) = bvl .
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(ii) p→ 1 for θ ∈ {θh, θl}.
Note that
lim
p→1
pi(y) = vh if n− 2y < 0
lim
p→1
pi(y) = qvh + (1− q)vl if n− 2y = 0
lim
p→1
pi(y) = vl if n− 2y > 0
As pi(y) converges to some constant (and, of course, the same holds for pi(y′)), so does
(f(e′(y′), e′(y′))pi(y′)− c(e′)) . We denote by V ∗(vh) (V ∗(vl)) [V ∗(v)] the limit when pi(y)
converges to vh (vl) [qvh + (1− q)vl].
Note further that if n−2y < 0, limp→1(qpy(1−p)n−y+(1−q)pn−y(1−p)y) = limp→1 qpy(1−
p)n−y. Then we know that
lim
p→1
=
 q if y = n0 otherwise
If n− 2y > 0, limp→1(qpy(1− p)n−y + (1− q)pn−y(1− p)y) = limp→1(1− q)pn−y(1− p)y. It
follows that
lim
p→1
=
 1− q if y = 00 otherwise
Last, if n−2y = 0, limp→1(qpy(1−p)n−y + (1− q)pn−y(1−p)y) = limp→1 py(1−p)n−y = 0,
as y, n > 0 From this it then follows that
lim
p→1
E(V ∗n ) = qV
∗(vh) + (1− q)V ∗(vl),
which is independent of n.
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(iii) q → 1.
Notice that,
lim
q→1
(qpy(1− p)n−y + (1− q)pn−y(1− p)y) = pn−y(1− p)y,
lim
q→1
pi(y) = vh.
It follows that limq→1E(V ∗n ) is a constant and independent of n.
Next, q → 0.
lim
q→0
(qpy(1− p)n−y + (1− q)pn−y(1− p)y) = pn−y(1− p)y,
lim
q→0
pi(y) = vl,
and limq→0E(V ∗n ) is constant.
(iv) Abundance of Information: next →∞.
We want to show that
lim
n→∞E(V
∗
n ) = E(V
∗).
We know that for each n, E(V ∗n ) ≤ E(V ∗n+1) as V ∗n is a submartingale and thatE(V ∗n ) ≤ vh
for all n. By the monotone convergence theorem, we know that a finite limit exists, which
we denote by E(V ∗).
Proof of Proposition 6: Trade-Off Between Information and Peer Pressure
We assume that a D-worker has a higher degree and hence more signals nint and has
clustering (sr)D. In turn, a C-worker has a lower degree and thus a lower number of sig-
nals (and therefore sD > sC) but higher clustering and therefore (sr)C > (sr)D. Further,
assume vl = 0.
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(i) Wage Dynamics:
Claim 1: wD(θ) > wC(θ) ⇒ E(w′D) > E(w′C).
From definition (2), it follows that the second period expected wage across states is de-
fined as
E(w′) = qw′(θ, θ′h) + (1− q)w′(θ, θ′l) = qw′(θ, θ′h)
where the second equality is due to vl = 0 and where we dropped the subindex i for
convenience. Also, recall
w′(θ, θ′h) ≡ sPr(γ′g|θ)E(e′(y′)|θh)f(1, 1)vh
wherePr(γ′g|θ) ≡ E(e(y)|θ)rf(1, 1)+1−r. Suppose that in the first periodwD(θ) > wC(θ),
implying E(e(y)D|θ) > E(e(y)C |θ). Moreover, by assumption, sC < sD and (sr)C >
(sr)D.Hence, [sPr(γg|θ)]D > [sPr(γg|θ)]C . Last, by Proposition 2,E(e′(y′)D|θ′h) > E(e′(y′)C |θ′h)
and therefore w′D(θ, θ′h) > w
′C(θ, θ′h). Thus, w
D(θ) > wC(θ) implies E(w′D) > E(w′C),
which proves the claim.
Claim 2: (a) wD(θ) = wC(θ)⇒ E(w′D) > E(w′C).
(b)wD(θ) > wC(θ)⇒ E(w′D) > E(w′C) even ifE(e′(y′)D|θ′h) = E(e′(y′)C |θ′h).
(a) Even ifwD(θ) = wC(θ) and thusE(e(y)D|θ) = E(e(y)C |θ), we have [sPr(γg|θ)]D >
[sPr(γg|θ)]C due to sC < sD and (sr)C > (sr)D. Also, by Proposition 2, E(e′(y′)D|θ′h) >
E(e′(y′)C |θ′h) and thereforew′D(θ, θ′h) > w′C(θ, θ′h). It follows: wD(θ) = wC(θ)⇒ E(w′D) >
E(w′C).
(b) We use a similar argument as in (a). Even if uncertainty vanishes in the sec-
ond period, that is even if the D-worker loses his informational advantage, implying
E(e′(y′)D|θ′h) = E(e′(y′)C |θ′h), it holds that if wD(θ) > wC(θ) then E(w′D) > E(w′C),
because [sPr(γg|θ)]D > [sPr(γg|θ)]C .
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(ii) Comparative Advantage:
We want to show that E(w
C)
E(wD)
increases in n, q and p > p∗ if E(pi(y)|θh) and EV ∗(y′)
are sufficiently concave in n, q and p, respectively. First notice that, assuming vl = 0,
E(wC)
E(wD)
=
qwC(θh)
qwD(θh)
=
[E(pi(y)|θh)]C + β(sr)C [EV ∗(γ′g, y′)]C
[E(pi(y)|θh)]D + β(sr)D[EV ∗(γ′g, y′)]D
(19)
where we used the definition of wages and the expression for equilibrium effort (7). We
want to show that (19) is increasing as uncertainty vanishes. To illustrate the argument,
we show this for the case of increasing n (strictly, speaking we let next increase). We adopt
the following notation
[E(pi(y)|θh)]C = E(pi(yn)|θh)
[E(pi(y)|θh)]D = E(pi(yn+1)|θh)
[EV ∗(γ′g, y
′)]C = EV ∗(y′n)
[EV ∗(γ′g, y
′)]D = EV ∗(y′n+1)
(sr)C = sr
(sr)D = sr
We will show that (19) is increasing in n, that is,
E(pi(yn)|θh) + βsrEV ∗(y′n)
E(pi(yn+1)|θh) + βsrEV ∗(y′n+1)
>
E(pi(yn−1)|θh) + βsrEV ∗(y′n−1)
E(pi(yn)|θh) + βsrEV ∗(y′n)
(20)
if E(pi(y)|θh) and EV ∗(y′) are sufficiently concave, i.e. if
EV ∗(y′n)
2 > EV ∗(y′n−1)EV
∗(y′n+1) (21)
E(pi(yn)|θh)2 > E(pi(yn+1|θh))E(pi(yn−1)|θh) (22)
EV ∗(y′n)
EV ∗(y′n−1)
E(pi(yn)|θh)
E(pi(yn+1)|θh) >
sr
sr
>
EV ∗(y′n+1)
EV ∗(y′n)
E(pi(yn−1)|θh)
E(pi(yn)|θh) . (23)
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To show this, rearrange (20) to get:
[E(pi(yn)|θh)]2 − E(pi(yn+1)|θh)E(pi(yn−1)|θh)+
srsrβ2([EV ∗(y′n)]
2 − EV ∗(y′n+1)EV ∗(y′n−1))+
βsrE(pi(yn)|θh)EV ∗(y′n)− βsrE(pi(yn−1)|θh)EV ∗(y′n+1)+
βsrE(pi(yn)|θh)EV ∗(y′n)− βsrE(pi(yn+1)|θh)EV ∗(y′n−1) > 0
This expression is positive if (21)-(23) hold. To see that (21)-(23) are implied by sufficiently
strong concavity note the following. A function f(n) is log-concave if:
f(n+ 1)f(n− 1) < f(n)2 (24)
Hence, for (21)-(23) to hold, E(pi(y)|θh) and EV ∗(y′) must be sufficiently log-concave.
But concavity implies log-concavity: Concavity of an increasing discrete function means
1
2
(f(n+ 1) + f(n− 1)) < f(n) (25)
Then (25) implies (24) since
1
2
(f(n+ 1) + f(n− 1)) > (f(n+ 1)f(n− 1))0.5.
Last, we established before thatE(pi(y)|θh) andEV ∗(y′) are increasing in n and converge.
Consequently, for all n > n∗, E(pi(y)|θh) and EV ∗(y′) are concave as defined in (25). We
focus on the part of the parameter space where E(pi(y)|θh) and EV ∗(y′) are sufficiently
concave, i.e. where conditions (21)-(23) hold.
The arguments that (19) is increasing in p (for p > p∗) and q are analogous and slightly
simpler because E(pi(y)|θh) and EV ∗(y′) are continuously differentiable in p and q. We
omit them for brevity and instead highlight some of our simulation results.
To graphically illustrate the comparative advantage results, we compute a parametric
example of this model and provide some simulations. Effort and cost functions are re-
spectively given by f(ei, ej) =
√
ei, ej and c(ei) = 12e
2
i .We set the parameters s.t. e < emax
always holds (see Table 6).
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Table 6: Baseline Parameters
vl vh p q β d
W dM CW CM N
0 1 0.75 0.5 0.9 2 3 2 1 10
Figure 2: Expected Wage of Agent with Higher Clustering Relative to Agent with More
Information
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0.98
0.99
1
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
next
E(
wC
) /
 E
(w
D )
(a) As a Function of External Info
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
1.01
1.02
1.03
vl
E(
wC
) /
 E
(w
D )
(b) As a Function of Low Value
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
0.98
0.99
1
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
p
E(
wC
) /
 E
(w
D )
p*
(c) As a Function of Signal Precision
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(d) As a Function of Prior Belief
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